Leave Deustua | China and India’s rapprochement with Russia does not indicate cooperation between them Comment

Last March, China and India did not vote on two UN General Assembly resolutions condemning Russia’s occupation of Ukraine, demanding the immediate withdrawal of occupation forces (first) and respect for humanitarian law in that war (second case).

Earlier, in February, Russia and China signed a joint declaration in which they recognized each other as major powers, reaffirmed their rights in “common neighborhoods”, agreed to recognize the moment of change that the international body was experiencing, and proved against. The one-sidedness of the “few actors” (read US and economic coercion) reaffirmed their strategic cooperation and underscored their “unlimited friendship”. Was the joint declaration a response to an alliance or one of the security cooperation that would allow China to assert Russia as its “main ally”?

Now that the invasion has exposed emerging Western measures in political and economic support (including sanctions against Russia) and arms supplies to Ukraine, China has seen the need to clarify its position against key economic partners.

At a recent virtual summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and EU officials (Commission and European Council leaders, Úrsula Von der Leyen and Charles Michel), the hostile vision of the aforementioned pioneers was revealed only. Conflict. These have put the parties in opposite positions with no other approach than pragmatism in the bilateral relationship.

In fact, while the EU has suggested to China that it is necessary to stay out of the annexation, given the “reputation impact” of Chinese support for Russia, the Chinese president has suggested that the EU take a stand. Independent from the United States at the moment (Reuters). There is no mention of an alliance.

Furthermore, if China and the EU exchanged about 2 billion euros daily and concluded negotiations on a public investment agreement (December 2020), Europe would move between $ 250 billion and $ 500 billion in acquisitions (Royal University of European Studies CEU San Pablo University), at that meeting Was, is the fluidity of one of the major economic currents in the global scenario.

This flow could be severely affected if the parties do not formalize the aforementioned investment agreement within the framework of the agreed conditions, if China engages in economic activities with Russia, or within the limits of the sanctions imposed on that authority. The current expansion of the European strategy of “building” relations with China has been strongly infiltrated by the current extreme situation (as it may be).

This probability is not low in the context of strengthening Sino-Russian economic relations, which have significantly increased the use of national currencies in bilateral trade. This strategy would be even less friendly in light of the energy conflict with Europe (China is the world’s second largest oil consumer with a large absorption capacity) and the potential for a huge increase in Chinese oil imports from Russia in light of supply. A large quantity of goods – including high-tech goods – are being shipped to Russia today (and a new package is coming), which has been hit by Western sanctions.

On the other hand, since China is in the Eurasian conflict, its position may attract other Asian countries, sending the question of their role in the conflict to the West. This impetus will increase with the growing urge to use the yuan in Asian inter-regional trade (for example, China has struggled to establish an Asian payment system – the interbank payment system -CIPS- based on the renminbi with the Western bank. Support in Asia – as an alternative to the Russian-excluded SWIFT).

However, not everything in Asia goes in the Chinese direction. The growing expansion of that power in the South China Sea, the fears it raises in its neighbors, its conflicting relations with Japan and South Korea, and its demand for greater occupation of Taiwan as part of the Chinese region have created growing evidence in the region. To the balance of power.

To prevent Chinese domination and expansion in the Pacific, the West has created the US-British-Australian mechanism AUKUS to control China in the Indian Ocean. QUAD is part of the Joint Security Council, a defense cooperation dialogue mechanism that includes the major Asian powers, India and Japan.

These security regimes alone will not reduce security cooperation with China’s neighbors. This capitulation also includes the loss of solidarity among the Asian members of the BRICS organization in Diminusio. That organization has lost centrifugal power among the large and medium powers that wanted to increase their position to play a greater role in the international arena.

In fact, the members of that group (Brazil, India and South Africa, as well as China and Russia) have for some time been playing unique roles in the strategic transformation in which we live. The centrifugal tendencies of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict will further enhance that unity.

This is the position of India, which has condemned Russia’s invasion and has not supported UN General Assembly resolutions.

While it is true that this position brings India and Russia closer, this approach is being balanced by Indian security associations with the West, which will intensify New Delhi’s use of regional power balance rather than just the Central Asian alignment. Bye.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has visited New Delhi in the wake of India’s “neutral” decision at the UN and the old co-operation between India and the former Soviet Union (and Russia), while China has failed to improve friendly relations. With the EU in Brussels.

Following in the footsteps of Soviet-era practices, the Russian Foreign Minister offered his Indian Foreign Minister Subramaniam Jaisankar a significant increase in sales of oil, grain, sunflower oil and coking coal at “political” prices.

To meet the basic needs of the Indian people and industry, the supply of these scarce goods due to the war may be manna from heaven. Especially if it is exchanged in rupees and rubles (as in the Chinese case with the yuan) allowing Russia to escape denial of funding in dollars, thus dominating the currency basis of that currency.

Furthermore, the strengthening of Indo-Russian relations supports fluid and cheap access to Russian military concessions (India consistently relies heavily on this resource) and supports the development of large-scale projects such as the NSTC (North). -South Multimedia Transport that will allow India to connect with the Baltic) Its ambition is similar to the dimension of the Beltway route and the Chinese route.

If that geopolitical agenda competes with China, India’s participation in the QUAD Security Cooperation Mechanism with North American, Australian and Japanese partners determined to control Chinese expansion in the Indian Ocean will increase competition with that force.

If this security relationship in 2021 had been strengthened by recent US-sponsored mutual presidential visits, India would have decided not to fully reach it for decades and to alleviate its dependence on Russian weapons by accessing US military supplies. Sources and French.

This happened in 1962, when India had to seek US help to control China on its border, as the Sino-Indian rivalry was old. It was later exacerbated by Chinese support for Bangladesh (a separatist country) and Pakistan (a US-backed Muslim rival).

As in the case of China, if the conflict in Eastern Europe and its Eurasian predictions renew old rivalries, these are intensified or reduced by seeking various means of balance of power between Asian countries and the BRICS members.

In this context, this mechanism of cooperation between the forces of aspiration finds less common interests than it has already lost, while the new roles demanded by the transformation of the international system are more unique. Although China and India claim to be neutral in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, this does not imply greater cooperation between them than timely and practical cooperation. Unlike in the Sino-Russian case, the rivalry between them may have intensified in the context of increasing competition for power in the international arena.